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Much of the R&D in Network Centric Warfare has been on technology.  Improvements 
in connectivity and processing speed challenge the integration of technological and 
human elements into a single C2 framework.  The Dynamic Model of Situated Cognition 
(DMSC) was developed as an analysis method explicitly representing the human-
technology relationships.  It takes into account that sensors are susceptible to errors and 
to attack; inaccurate data from technological systems may propagate as misinformation to 
decision-makers.  Any organization, including edge organizations, then makes decisions 
under uncertainty.  This paper analyzes the use of signal validation to address 
shortcomings of technological systems.  The sensor system should present validated 
information to operators; and, when it cannot, it should identify uncertain information.  
Signal validation filters the blue forces’ sensor errors and red forces’ information warfare 
misinformation.  As a result, the blue forces are presented with synthesized validated data 
or are informed it is uncertain.  The impact of signal validation on knowledge flows and 
quality of decision-making in Command and Control processes using the DMSC is 
simulated with the computational modeling environment POW-ER (Project, 




Network Centric Warfare (NCW) has been in existence for over ten years [Cebrowski & 
Garstka, 1998].  Much of the effort put forth by NCW proponents has been focused on 
technology.  Improvements in bandwidth, connectivity, and processing speed have 
moved us closer to the time where military practitioners of all services, in every part of 
the battlespace, will have access to the same data.  Focusing on technological solutions 
with little consideration for the capabilities and limitations of the warfighters is 
imprudent.  The result is that these novel technologies provide capabilities not needed by 
warfighters or they function in ways that are not compatible with warfighters.  These 
solutions will quickly fall into disuse or will distract warfighters from the tasks that are 
truly important for mission accomplishment.  Equally unacceptable is a narrow focus on 
cognitive processes of the humans without considering the military context or the 
technologies with which the warfighters must interact.  Findings in this area by 
themselves may have limited applicability to warfighting.  These findings must be shared 
with technologists who can then incorporate them into the design of new systems.  Thus, 
cooperation and collaboration between technologists and human performance experts are 
critical to the success of NCW. 
 
In 2003, the Dynamic Model for Situated Cognition (DMSC) was introduced in response 
to weaknesses in previous models to represent the entirety of a network centric 
organization.  By explicitly including the human elements of a Command and Control 
(C2) system, it provided analysts with a means to address their capabilities and 
limitations as required by a complete doctrine, organization, training, materiel, logistics, 
personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) perspective. 
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Quantifying human decision-making in the presence of incomplete and sometimes 
erroneous sensor data is a challenge.  Poor decisions can result in loss of life and mission 
failure.  Where mistakes are caught, even in a timely manner, they may result in large 
volumes of coordination and rework effort that can overwhelm an organization. This 
coordination and rework is hidden effort: it is not planned, tracked, managed or even 
acknowledged except by the overworked staff.  We have found no single model that can 
adequately represent the impact of poor decisions nor represent how organizational 
structures along with data fusion can minimize the risk of such a decision.  Specifically, 
how can human-focused knowledge networks & trust relationships influence decision-
making?  How can technology-focused techniques such as signal validation improve 
those decisions?  This paper examines the application of Virtual Design Teams (VDT) 
[Jin & Levitt, 1996] with its extensions for edge organizations [Ramsey, MacKinnon & 
Levitt, 2007; Orr & Nissen, 2006] to this problem. 
 
Review of the Dynamic Model of Situated Cognition 
 
As first conceived, DMSC consisted of six ovals and three lenses.  This is illustrated in 
Figure 1: Original DMSC, where there is a distinction between the roles of hardware and 
software system elements and the roles of people-ware elements.  The three ovals on the 
left side (Ovals 1, 2 and 3) represent the technological side of the system.  The three 
ovals on the right side represent the human cognitive processes [Miller & Shattuck, 
2004].  Oval 1 represents ground truth of the total battlespace.  This includes location and 
status of friendly, enemy and neutral forces; as well as terrain, weather and other 
environmental conditions.  Oval 2 and Oval 3 are always subsets of the true picture, 
representing sensed objects and which of those are presented to users.  The quantity and 
quality of the information is a function of sensor parameters and C2 system parameters.  
Not only is there a selective filtering of which parts of Oval 1 are propagated, but there is 












Figure 1: Original DMSC 
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Ovals 4, 5 and 6 on the right side of the model represent the perception of data elements, 
the comprehension of the current situation (sometimes called a mental model) and the 
individual’s projection of current events into the future.  Three lenses (A, B, and C) that 
transform the information between these last ovals consist of the local situation, the 
military OPerational ORDer (OPORD), military doctrine, the experience of the operator, 
and an individual’s temporary state (stress, fatigue, etc). 
 
Combat, especially under conditions of asymmetric threats and NCW, is a challenging 
environment for decision-making.  As with any human-based enterprise, mistakes of 
perception and comprehension occur.  Lense distortions result in inaccuracies in 
perceptions (Oval 4), comprehensions, (Oval 5) or projections (Oval 6).   
Information from different sources may be in conflict.  Sensors are susceptible to false 
positives and false negatives.  The “red forces” are likely to use electronic combat tactics 
that provide misleading information to the “blue forces” and vice versa.  To address this 
issue, Miller and Shattuck [2006] have modified their initial DMSC model to account for 
the fact that the data provided by the “Technological Systems” may be flawed and that it 
may propagate as misinformation to the “Perceptual and Cognitive Systems”, i.e. 
decision-maker, with the potential for disastrous consequences.  Figure 2 [Miller & 




Figure 2: Sources of errors in situation awareness 
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Once inaccurate data are accepted into any stage of the hardware identification and 
human cognition processes, this inaccuracy propagates through the remaining ovals, 
leading to inaccurate conclusions and potentially poor decisions on the part of a force 
commander.  Any organizational structure, including the edge organization, then faces 
making decisions under uncertainty, which is challenging even in a conducive 
environment.  To aggravate the situation, the warfighters often have to make life-bearing 
decisions that require short response times under a high-level of fatigue or stress.  In 
these situations, the decision process is “perceptual rather than conceptual” [Hutton and 
Klein, 1999].  The model can include feedback loops to represent the result of decision-
making processes.  These decisions include direction to physical forces and management 
of sensor and network resources as shown in Figure 3 [Miller & Shattuck, 2004]. Other 
feedback includes adjustments to OPORD and local doctrine, which is an attempt by the 













Figure 3: DMSC with oval feedback 
A more thorough treatment of the original model, recent extensions, and current 
applications can be found in Miller and Shattuck, 2006.  Figures 1 and 2 are from that 





As discussed above, the design of sensor systems is critical to NCW.  Key requirements 
are [Miller and Shattuck, 2006]: 
 
Requirement 1.  The sensor system shall provide coverage and protection to the high-
value assets against all credible threats. 
Requirement 2.  The sensor system shall be capable to detect spoofing activities. 
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Requirement 4.  The data display shall not overload operators. 
 
Requirement 1 is a complex and challenging problem for design and deployment of 
sensor systems for combat.  Because no sensor system can be fielded with perfect 
performance or unlimited resources, it raises issues of decision-making under uncertainty.  
Design choices on sensor modes, locations, and platform integration require a 
quantitative assessment of the risk-reduction capabilities of different sensor systems 
when considered part of a whole combat capability.  Suitable approaches exist for 
addressing Requirement 1 [Kujawski and Miller, 2007]. 
 
In this paper, we investigate the use of signal validation to meet Requirements 2-4.  
Using signal validation, the sensor system should present validated information to the 
operators or identify the information as uncertain and/or malicious.  The resulting DMSC 
model is depicted in Figure 4.  Signal validation filters the blue forces’ sensor errors and 
failures and red forces’ electronic combat misinformation.  As a result, the blue forces are 
presented with synthesized validated data or else are informed that the data is uncertain or 
inconclusive.  Signal validation helps to avoids data overload and reduces the probability 
of inappropriate actions. 
The difference between Figures 4 and 2 is that signal validation filters blue forces’ sensor 
errors and failures and red forces’ electronic combat misinformation.  The blue forces can 
then readily discern the accuracy and reliability of the displayed data. 
 
The key to successful signal validation is the ability to synthesize functionally diverse 
information in situations where the available direct data is not convincing.  One of the 
authors [Kujawski, et al, 1987] has developed an inference process or decision estimator 
based on a Bayesian formulation.  Related techniques are being successfully applied in 





Figure 4:  The use of signal validation to enhance situation awareness. 
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The POW-ER Simulation Software 
 
POW-ER (Project, Organization, and Work for Edge Research) is an extensible 
organization simulation platform developed as part of the Virtual Design Team (VDT) 
computational modeling research at Stanford University to optimize the workflow of an 
organization.  POW-ER inherits most of its basic functionality from earlier VDT models.  
They are based on a workflow in which a network of tasks is defined like a PERT chart 
of a project in which some product is created.  People within an organization are assigned 
to accomplish those tasks.  Mistakes in executing those tasks are allowed to occur via a 
stochastic simulation engine controlled by probabilistic estimates.  Rework occurs as a 
result of those mistakes.  POW-ER also addresses the organizational elements that impact 
the ability of people to work effectively, including policies and structures (culture, 
communication, decisions, and meetings), staffing, knowledge networks and worker skill 
specialization.  In a command and control system, the product being processed is 
information.  It is possible to create agents representing a watch organization team 
executing assigned tasks [Ramsey, MacKinnon & Levitt].  Functional specialization can 
be included, along with skill learning and un-learning.  It is relatively easy to run the 
simulation several times while changing knowledge networks, learning behavior, and 
even moving actors within an organization.  One can then observe the impact on project 
duration and risk, worker backlog and rework impact. 
 
Our goals are to (1) investigate the use of signal validation to improve the accuracy of 
information flows, (2) validate the DMSC against real data, and (3) demonstrate the 
applicability of the POW-ER simulation environment as a design tool for systems of 
systems including the warfighter.  We introduce inaccuracies at different “Ovals” to 
quantify their impact on different organizational structures with different knowledge 
networks and analyze the impact of signal validation for different scenarios.  We use the 
Tactical Network Topology field experiments as a sample organization engaged in 
decision-making in uncertainty to provide a baseline model to examine both signal 
validation and the situation simulation.  
 
 
Tactical Network Topology (TNT) Field Studies 
 
Each academic quarter, the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) conducts a week-long field 
exercise at Camp Roberts.  The exercises are sponsored by Special Operations Command 
(SOCOM) and are referred to as Tactical Network Topology (TNT) experiments.  The 
TNT exercises provide excellent opportunities for NPS faculty and students (and selected 
organizations external to NPS) to test novel hardware and software applications in a field 
setting.  The field setting, coupled with realistic scenarios, provides an attractive 
alternative to strictly controlled laboratory or computer-based simulation activities. 
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TNT 07-1 was conducted October 27 – November 3, 2006.  Three days were dedicated to 
comparing methods for conducting searches with small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
(UAV).  A total of 12 runs were completed.  The scenarios for all 12 runs were similar.  
Four vehicles enter Camp Roberts through a checkpoint; but shortly after being 
processed, a routine database check reveals that the vehicles contain suspected enemy 
personnel wanted for questioning.  UAVs are launched in an attempt to locate the four 
enemy vehicles.  These searches are conducted at the discretion of experienced UAV 
operators. 
 
Key players in these runs include the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) Commander, the 
Air Operations Commander (Air Boss), the Ground Operations Commander, the two 
UAV video feed observers in the TOC, the UAV operators in the field, and the red team 
commander.  The TNT mesh network carries the live video feed from the UAVs to the 
TOC.  The role of the TOC commander is supervisory in nature.  The air boss 
communicates directly with the three UAV ground control units (GCUs) and directs the 
administrative and operational activities of the UAVs, including search patterns.  The 
UAV video feed observers in the TOC were responsible for detecting and identifying the 
suspected enemy vehicles.  Once the video observers detect and locate an enemy vehicle 
in the UAV video feed, they relay that information to the TOC commander who directs 
the Ground Operations Commander to send his vehicles to intercept the enemy.  When 
that intercept occurs, the exercise is completed.  The advantage of using this particular set 
of field exercises is that the reports of the UAV video observers were recorded and 
compared to “ground truth” [Shattuck, Miller and Miller, 2006].  This section describing 
TNT 07-1 is from that work.  Mistakes in identifying and locating red team vehicles were 
identified as hits, misses, false alarms or correct rejections.  
 
 
Creating a POW-ER Model 
 
The TNT event is quite complicated.  It demonstrates the use of many different types of 
sensors, networks and personnel working together.  However, the missions executed were 
simple and limited in scope and time.  The command structure was equally simple.  The 
TOC Commander, based on input he received from the Air Boss and Ground Operations 
Commander, made all the decisions.  Figure 5 depicts the basic task-based representation 
of TOC operations.  It should be noted the organization most closely resembles a simple 
structure [Orr & Nissen, 2006] and is not an Edge organization.  Indeed, one could argue 
that many of the principles exercised in this particular TNT were counter to some of the 
basic tenets of NCW.  Further explanation of the task definitions requires some 
discussion of how actors are assigned to tasks and the level of work required.  There are 
three “effort types” to describe how working man-hours and calendar time is calculated.  
The first and most common is “work-volume” which is the number of full-time 
equivalents (FTEs) taken by an individual to complete a task successfully (not counting 
rework yet).  This is equivalent to the number of man-hour resources required for a task 
used when creating earned value project management tools.  The second effort type is 
“work-duration” which is the amount of time required for a task regardless of the FTEs 
assigned.  That is, it allows the modeler to accurately describe tasks that take, for 
instance, 10 days whether there are 2 or 5 or 10 people assigned.  The third effort type is 
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max-duration which is the amount of work that can not be exceeded.  This is equivalent 
to some service or consulting contracts that provide a given number of FTEs for a fixed 
amount of calendar time, regardless of task completion.  At the end of the contract, work 
on the task stops.  These are all common to creating Program Evaluation & Review 
Technique (PERT) charts or critical path method (CPM) and other task network project 
management tools.  The “Operate UAV” tasks are of effort type “work-duration” of 40 
minutes, which most closely simulates the fact that those are tied to the duration of the 
exercise, lasting until completion regardless of assigned position workload or other 
influences.  The tasks “Manage Operations” and “Manage Air Operations” are configured 
in a like manner.  The “Observe UAV video” tasks are of effort type “work-volume,” 
because in the model development we want to see the impact of rework and worker 
overload. 
While the tasks and assignments in Figure 5 reflect the basic processes within the TOC, 
this first simple model does not help answer any of the questions we have posed.  Tasks 
representing the video observers’ reports to the Air Boss and TOC Commander, the TOC 
Commander’s decision-making and the decision results need to be added.  Figure 6 
includes these additions.  (In Figure 6, those elements common to Figure 5 have been 
cropped to improve readability and focus on the changes from the baseline.) 
Figure 5: TNT 07-1 Baseline model in POW-ER 
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The model in Figure 6 still is not quite right, because the observers make reports 
constantly and the TOC commander makes decisions on where to deploy his ground 
forces based on those reports.  It is a cycle or series of “observe-report-decide” 
sequences.  This simulates just one sequence, but is representative of the entire evolution.  
Also, we have not yet included the possibility of making a mistake and the resulting 
rework.  We assume that it will be identified with most confidence during the “intercept 
red vehicle” task.  That is, when a friendly vehicle is dispatched to a location, but no 
enemy vehicle is present, something went wrong.  This is modeled as rework within the 
“decision” task, which in turn implies rework in the reporting tasks.  To account for this, 
we add communication links and rework links between those tasks (Figure 7, which has 
also been cropped to minimize redundant information from the baseline). 
 
 
A rework link identifies the flow of exceptions from a task to a previous one.  The 
“strength” of the link indicates how much rework in the target task is caused by one time 
increment of rework in the exception task.  Because intercepting a vehicle can take up to 
10 minutes in this scenario, but decision-making only takes a small fraction of this time, a 
strength value of 0.3 was assigned to that link.  That is, for time unit of rework involved 
in “intercept,” only 0.3 times that is reworked in “decision.”  Similarly, the strength of 
rework links from the decision task to the observe tasks was set to 1.0.  A communication 
Figure 6: Decision result 
Figure 7: Rework resulting from poor decisions 
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link between two tasks indicates that people assigned to them need to interact with each 
other.  This is important because it adds to the communication overhead required during 
rework.  The addition of rework requires us to set some variables at the project level in 
POW-ER.  The first of these is “Project Exception Probability” which represents the 
modeler’s estimate of how often an exception will occur on any task within the project.  
From this value, individual tasks can be assigned a solution complexity of high, medium 
or low which makes their probability of exception 20% less than, equal to, or 20% higher 
than the project exception probability.  We set the project probability at only 0.20 to start, 
which is consistent with a simple structure organization operating in a 21st century 
environment [Orr & Nissen, 2007].   As we are only interested in rework in the decision 
task and intercept task, we set the solution complexity of those tasks to “medium” and all 
other tasks to “low.”  While this model provides insight into the overhead and rework 
associated with incorrect decisions, it is challenging to quantify that in terms of the 
number of incorrect decisions made.  
 
Previous application of the DMSC to help quantify C2 performance in this TNT exercise 
identified each opportunity in which a target vehicle was within the sensor footprint of 
one of the UAVs and identified TOC personnel response as follows [Shattuck, Miller & 
Miller, 2007]: 
• Miss – Target in range of UAV but not detected by TOC personnel 
• Hit – Target in range of UAV and correctly detected by TOC personnel 
• False alarm – Target not in range of UAV, but TOC personnel report target 
present 
• Correct rejection – Target not in range of UAV and no detection reported.  
 
POW-ER provides for alternative and conditional processes via its “branch” element.  
One path is chosen over another based on the modeler’s input.  In this way, one can more 
accurately identify the impact of the four above conditions.  The additional probabilistic 
nodes and branches are depicted in Figure 8.  In the interest of keeping the diagram 
simple, duplicate actors and duplicate tasks have been combined. The resulting actors 
have been edited to reflect more than one full time equivalent and the work volumes of 
their assigned tasks have been similarly adjusted.  This seems more appropriate because 
we can now quantify rework resulting from misses and false alarms.  Indeed, rework and 
communications links have been included for those incorrectly processed cases. 
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Conclusions and Future Direction 
We have just scratched the surface in this area.  It is like wading into the confluence of 
the theories of human cognition as modeled in DMSC, computational modeling of 
organizations for C2, and sensor validation.  POW-ER can be used to model this kind of 
organizational structure engaged in this kind of decision-making.  Even though there are 
limitations in terms of faithfully representing the looping nature of searching for and then 
prosecuting target, we believe our simplifying assumptions are valid and will result in 
reliable results.  The next steps in the process are to map the results of POW-ER (rework, 
overhead and worker backlog) onto the appropriate ovals in the DMSC and to examine 
the differences a signal validation function would provide. 
Figure 8: Branches in model with rework 
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